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The goal of two-party cryptography is to enable two parties, Alice and Bob, to solve common
tasks without the need for mutual trust. Examples of such tasks are private access to a database,
and secure identification. Quantum communication enables security for all of these problems in the
noisy-storage model by sending more signals than the adversary can store in a certain time frame.
Here, we initiate the study of device-independent protocols for two-party cryptography in the noisy-
storage model. Specifically, we present a relatively easy to implement protocol for a cryptographic
building block known as weak string erasure and prove its security even if the devices used in the
protocol are prepared by the dishonest party. Device-independent two-party cryptography is made
challenging by the fact that Alice and Bob do not trust each other, which requires new techniques to
establish security. We fully analyse the case of memoryless devices (for which sequential attacks are
optimal) and the case of sequential attacks for arbitrary devices. The key ingredient of the proof,
which might be of independent interest, is an explicit (and tight) relation between the violation of
the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality observed by Alice and Bob and uncertainty generated
by Alice against Bob who is forced to measure his system before finding out Alice’s setting (guessing
with postmeasurement information). In particular, we show that security is possible for arbitrarily
small violation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution [BB84, Eke91] (QKD) allows two honest parties, Alice and Bob, to protect their communi-
cation from a nosy eavesdropper. Yet, there are many other tasks that Alice and Bob may wish to solve, in which they
themselves do not trust each other and secure identification is one such example. Here, Alice wants to identify herself
to Bob without revealing her password. Bit commitment and oblivious transfer constitute other well-known examples of
such tasks.
It is intuitive that security for two-party cryptographic protocols is more difficult to achieve than for QKD, since Alice
and Bob cannot help each other to check on the eavesdropper. Instead, every party has to fend for himself. It turns out that
even using quantum communication Alice and Bob cannot achieve security without making additional assumptions [May97,
LC97, Lo97, Col07]. Usually one relies on computational assumptions, i.e. that solving a computational puzzle requires a
large amount of computing resources, namely more than is available to the adversary. Instead of relying on computational
assumptions, however, it is possible to make physically motivated assumptions, for example that the adversary’s ability
to store information is limited. Introducing such storage restrictions was pioneered by Maurer [Mau91], who considered
imposing a restriction on the adversary’s ability to store classical bits known as the bounded-storage model. Unfortunately,
the fact that (i) classical storage is cheap and plentiful and (ii) the gap between what the honest parties need to implement
the protocol and what a dishonest party needs to break it is only polynomial [Cac97], renders this model less practical.
In contrast, storing quantum information reliably is an extremely difficult problem, motivating the so-called bounded-
quantum storage [DFSS05, DFR+07] or more generally noisy-storage model [WST08, KWW12]. The noisy-storage model
admits protocols that require no quantum storage for the honest execution and that can be implemented in a manner
similar to QKD using BB84 [WST08, KWW12, DFW15], six-state [BFW14] or continuous variable [FSW15] encodings.
Significantly, security can always be achieved as long as the number of qubits n sent in the protocol is only slightly larger
than the number of qubits r that the adversary can store, that is, whenever r . n−O(log n) [DFW15], which is essentially
optimal. First implementations of bit commitment [NJM+12] and oblivious transfer [ENG+14] in the noisy-storage model
have been demonstrated. Note that there exist other assumptions that make two-party cryptography possible, e.g. that
the two parties are given access to guaranteed additional resources [Riv99, Cré97, WNI03], or that they must delegate
agents who cannot communicate during the protocol (which might be motivated by special relativity) [BGKW88, Ken99,
Ken05, Sim07, CSST11, Ken11, Ken12, KTHW13, Kan15]. The noisy-storage model is particularly interesting since in
contrast to computational or relativistic assumptions, security is preserved even if the assumption is invalidated at a later
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point. That is, security cannot be broken retroactively if the adversary acquires a larger quantum storage device in the
future, making this assumption completely future-proof.
One of the central questions in (quantum) cryptography is finding the minimal assumptions which are sufficient to
guarantee security. For example in the standard QKD scenario we assume that the quantum channel between Alice
and Bob is untrusted (i.e. it is fully controlled by the eavesdropper) but the devices used by Alice and Bob inside their
laboratories are fully characterised. Already early on, however, it was recognized that violation of a Bell inequality is
intimately linked to cryptographic security [Eke91]. Mayers and Yao [MY98, MY04] went on to realise that quantum
states can be self-tested, i.e. that certain quantum properties can be verified by a purely classical user, which started
the field of device-independent (DI) quantum cryptography. In DI cryptography instead of assuming that we know how
the devices work, we simply test them during the protocol by using them to exhibit Bell nonlocality [BCP+14]. DI
cryptography has been one of the most active research topics within quantum cryptography, predominantly in the context
of QKD [BHK05, AGM06, ABG+07, BCK13, RUV13, VV14, MS14a, MS14b, ARKP15] and randomness expansion or
amplification [CK11, PAM+10, VV12, CVY13, BPPP14, MS14a, MS14b].
DI two-party cryptography, on the other hand, remains a largely unexplored territory. Security of a protocol for
imperfect coin flipping and bit commitment has been analysed in the DI regime [SCA+11, AMPS16]. Significantly, the
setting considered by these works is different: since the authors do not impose any extra assumptions, they cannot hope to
reach the perfect primitive so they aim for an imperfect implementation instead. Moreover, Adlam and Kent have recently
proposed a DI relativistic bit commitment protocol [AK15], which allows security for a fixed amount of time under the
assumption that each party is split into space-like separated agents.
Here, we take the very first step in proving DI security for two-party cryptographic protocols in the noisy-storage model.
That is, we establish the security of these protocols even if the devices are not trusted under some extra assumptions
(either we require the devices to behave identically in every round or we require the attack of the dishonest party to be
sequential). To accomplish this, there are a number of conceptual as well as technical hurdles to cross.
1. In QKD Alice and Bob are always honest, while Eve is always trying to break the protocol. In DI QKD it is therefore
natural to give the power to prepare the devices to Eve. Analogously, we will assume here that all the devices used
in the protocol are always prepared by the dishonest party.
2. In the following section we will see that the protocol we start with uses quantum communication between Alice
and Bob. This means that the adversary who prepared the devices will receive quantum communication coming
back from the devices. This is in sharp contrast to DI QKD, in which Eve prepares the devices – with which she is
possibly entangled – and then Alice and Bob simply push buttons on the devices to perform measurements. That
is, there is no quantum communication going back to Eve. This feature introduces a significant difference between
the security analysis of DI QKD and DI two-party cryptography protocol considered here and requires us to develop
novel proof techniques.
A. Results
To establish DI security of two-party protocols, we will establish the DI security for a universal two-party primitive
known as weak string erasure (WSE) [KWW12]. The most convenient manner of describing a new primitive is to specify
its input-output behaviour. Such an abstract description is known as the ideal functionality and the ideal functionality
of WSE is explained in Fig. 1. Universality means that a secure implementation of WSE can be used to construct any
other two-party cryptographic primitive. In particular, the well-known primitive of bit commitment can be obtained from
WSE using classical post-processing. Since classical post-processing is trusted in the model of DI quantum cryptography,
this means that once we construct a DI protocol for WSE, we have obtained a protocol for any primitive that can
be obtained from WSE using classical post-processing. Moreover, the final security bound (1) immediately implies the
device-independent security of an oblivious transfer protocol in the bounded storage model (for details see Section 4.3 of
Ref. [DFR+07]).
We propose a DI protocol for WSE whose security is certified by the violation of the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt
(CHSH) [CHSH69] inequality (see Section II B 1 for details). We make the assumption that it is always the dishonest
party that produced the devices. However, we will argue that dishonest Alice cannot gain any advantage by preparing
Bob’s devices so only the case of dishonest Bob requires detailed analysis. Before the protocol begins Bob provides Alice
with two separate devices: a source of bipartite quantum states, combined with a measurement devices, plus one additional
measurement devices that Alice can use for testing (see Fig. 2). According to the ideal specification this setup should be
capable of producing the maximal violation of the CHSH inequality. In the protocol, Alice will use a switch to either send
a quantum state to the test device or to Bob. That is, she sometimes uses her devices to violate the CHSH inequality (the
test rounds) while sometimes she only measures one of the particles and passes the other one to Bob (the live rounds).
Intuitively, observing a high CHSH violation in the test rounds implies that measurements performed by the devices are
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Alice
{0, 1}n 3 Xn WSE
Bob
I ⊆ [n], |I| ≈ n
2
XI ∈ {0, 1}|I|
Fig. 1. The ideal functionality of WSE [KWW12]: Alice gets a randomly chosen bit string Xn while Bob obtains a randomly chosen
subset of indices I ⊆ [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} and the bits of Xn corresponding to the indices in I, denoted by XI . Security means
that if Bob is honest, then Alice cannot learn the index set I. That is, she does not learn which bits of the string Xn are known
to Bob. Conversely, if Alice is honest, then Bob finds it difficult to guess the entire string quantified by a lower bound on the
min-entropy Hmin(Xn|Bob) ≥ λn (equivalent to an upper bound on the guessing probability pguess(Xn|Bob) ≤ 2−λn), where λ is a
real parameter specified by the ideal functionality. Whenever λ > 0, WSE is useful for constructing other cryptographic primitives
like bit commitment. We defer formal definitions until Section II B 5.
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Fig. 2. Honest execution of the DI WSE protocol. The main device prepares an EPR pair |ΨAB〉, measures the A system in either
the computational (θ = 0) or Hadamard (θ = 1) basis (chosen uniformly at random) to produce x ∈ {0, 1}, while the B system is
sent to the switch. Now, Alice chooses to either perform a test or play a live round. Whenever she decides to execute a test (with
probability q), the switch directs B to the test device, and she performs a CHSH test between the main device and the test device.
That is, she chooses a random input t ∈ {0, 1} and checks the CHSH condition x⊕ y = θ · t on the outputs x, y ∈ {0, 1}. Whenever,
she decides to play a live round (with probability 1 − q) she uses the switch to send B to Bob, who measures the incoming qubit
in either the computational (θ′ = 0) or Hadamard (θ′ = 1) basis (chosen uniformly at random) to produce z ∈ {0, 1}, respectively.
After n live rounds, both parties wait time ∆t, which enforces the storage assumption, after which Alice announces her basis string
θn = θ1θ2 . . . θn. At the end Alice holds a random string xn = x1x2 . . . xn, while Bob has an index set I = {j ∈ [n] : θj = θ′j} and a
substring xI := (xj)j∈I .
incompatible, which leads to uncertainty (against a classical adversary) in the live rounds. For completeness, let us stress
the importance of the assumption that Alice has full control over the switch, i.e. she is free to choose which rounds are used
for testing and which rounds are used in the protocol (sometimes referred to as the free will assumption). This assumption
is crucial from the theoretical point (it implies that the sample used to assess the performance of the devices cannot be
influenced by the dishonest party, which is important since in many cases even limited influence may completely break
the security), but it is also reasonable from a practical point of view (a switch is a simple enough device to be prepared
by Alice herself).
In the dishonest scenario we allow Bob to prepare all the devices and in addition he receives quantum communication
from Alice during the protocol as depicted in Fig. 3. Here, we analyse two distinct security models.
• Memoryless devices (against an arbitrary attack)
We call a device memoryless if its behaviour is identical every time it is used and there are no correlations between
different uses. This is a convenient assumption because for such devices the observed CHSH violation β is a well-
defined quantity and can be estimated to arbitrary precision. As explained in Fig. 1 the goal of WSE is to generate
a string Xn that Bob is at least partially ignorant about as quantified by the min-entropy Hmin(Xn|Bob). In case
of Bob whose quantum storage is restricted to be of dimension at most d we show that
Hmin(X
n|Bob) ≥ nf(β)− log d (1)
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Fig. 3. Dishonest Bob prepared all the devices. This means that the state generated by the source can be chosen arbitrarily by Bob,
and similarly he can adjust the measurements performed by the main and test device. Alice has control of the correctly functioning
switch to decide whether she wants to test or perform a live round. Honest Alice proceeds as before, however, Bob is not restricted
to performing BB84 measurements on the returning quantum states. In sharp contrast to DI QKD, the dishonest party thus receives
quantum communication coming back from the devices, which calls for new techniques. As we will show below, it will be enough to
consider the case where Bob measures the resulting quantum states to obtain some classical information. We will then establish a
bound on the min-entropy that Bob has about the string xn, given this classical information k and the basis information received
later. Using standard methods [KWW12], we can then turn this into a security statement in the noisy-storage model.
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Fig. 4. Lower bound on the min-entropy rate f(β) as a function of the CHSH violation β. Crucially, we have f(β) > 0, whenever
β > 2. This means that security can be achieved for arbitrarily small violation of the CHSH inequality.
or equivalently
pguess(X
n|Bob) ≤ d · 2−nf(β),
where f(β) is a simple function plotted in Fig. 4 and log ≡ log2. Thus, to achieve security against such an adversary
it suffices to choose n large enough to guarantee nf(β)− log d > 0. For adversaries whose quantum storage is noisy
rather than bounded the analysis is slightly more involved and can be found in Section IIC 1 (explicit security bound
in Proposition 5). In either case positive min-entropy rate implies that the protocol can be used for constructing
more complicated primitives like bit commitment or oblivious transfer.
• General devices against a sequential attack
In case of devices with memory (whose behaviour may change during the protocol and in particular there might be
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Fig. 5. Values of the decay rate αmin(q, γ) calculated numerically as a function of q for various values of γ.
correlations between different rounds) the analysis is more involved both from the conceptual and technical point of
view. First, we must realise that we cannot in advance test the devices (to estimate their quality) and use the results
to make a security statement simply because the behaviour of the devices might change in time. In particular, it is
clear that the devices must not know whether they are currently being tested or not. Therefore, the test rounds and
the live rounds must be interspersed and we can only make a security statement about the combined performance.
In this case the test rounds must be explicitly included in the protocol and we adapt the simplest solution in which
before every round Alice flips a biased coin and either plays a test round (with probability q) or a live round (with
probability 1− q). After n rounds she computes the fraction of successful CHSH rounds fCHSH and checks whether
it exceeds some previously chosen threshold γ. Note that estimating fCHSH plays the role of estimating β in the
memoryless scenario: once the devices are allowed to have memory and change behaviour from round to round, β
is no longer a well-defined quantity and fCHSH is the best approximation thereof. If fCHSH ≥ γ she declares the
protocol to have terminated successfully, otherwise she aborts. Intuitively, what we want to avoid is the situation
in which Alice believes that the protocol has terminated correctly but nevertheless Bob actually knows the entire
string xn and we denote such an event by F (failure). Suppose n rounds are executed with parameters q ∈ [0, 1]
and γ ∈ [ 34 , 1]. We call an attack sequential if after every round Bob is required to produce a classical outcome
and his guess for that round is required to be a (classical) post-processing of that outcome combined with the basis
information and any information from the previous rounds (see Section IIC 2 for a more detailed explanation). It
is worth noting that this assumption removes the need to restrict Bob’s storage capabilities: since he is forced to
commit to his guess immediately after the round is over, storing the quantum system does not help). We show that
in the sequential scenario the probability of failure is bounded by
Pr[F ] ≤ [αmin(q, γ)]n, (2)
where αmin(q, γ) can be easily calculated for any (valid) choice of q and γ (cf. Fig. 5). Alternatively, we can write
Pr[F ] in terms of the probability of passing the test ppass and the probability of successfully guessing the entire “live”
string (restricted to sequential guessing strategies, see Section II B 2 for a precise definition) conditioned on passing
the test pseqguess(XL|Bob, pass)
Pr[F ] = ppass · pseqguess(XL|Bob, pass) ≤ [αmin(q, γ)]n. (3)
Our analysis is tight in the sense that it identifies correctly the pairs (q, γ) for which security is possible, i.e. we show
that αmin(q, γ) < 1 unless q = 0 (Alice never tests), q = 1 (Alice never plays a live round) or γ = 34 (the threshold
can be achieved by a classical strategy). This means that the probability of the devices performing well in the test
rounds and failing to implement a secure WSE decays exponentially in the total number of rounds. The technique
we use to prove this result is generic and can be applied to any situation in which the combined performance of two
(or more) games is assessed (as long as there is some non-trivial trade-off between them).
These two contributions should be seen as steps towards a security proof against the most general attack. The memoryless
model might be of independent interest since it captures the case of devices which are faulty rather than malicious (e.g. due
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to some misalignment of optical components); such scenarios are usually modelled as permanent deviations from the ideal
specification rather than time-dependent ones.
II. METHODS
In Section IIA we present the original protocol for WSE using trusted devices, in Section II B we introduce the relevant
quantities and prove some technical lemmas, in Section IIC 1 we formalise the scenario of memoryless devices and prove
security statement (1) and in Section IIC 2 we analyse the case of arbitrary devices against sequential attacks and prove
security claim (2).
A. The original WSE protocol for trusted devices
To build intuition, let us first describe the original protocol for WSE [KWW12], which works under the assumption that
the devices used by Alice and Bob are perfect and prepared in a trustworthy fashion. We sketch out a simple security
argument and discuss how to make the protocol device-independent. Note that there exist more sophisticated arguments
which give better security guarantees but they seem to be more difficult to adapt to the DI scenario.
Protocol 1: WSE in the noisy-storage model
(1) Alice chooses two uniform n-bit strings xn, θn ∈ {0, 1}n, generates the n-qubit state
n⊗
j=1
Hθj |xj〉,
where H is the Hadamard gate, and sends it to Bob. (Note that this just a sequence of n randomly chosen
BB84 [BB84] states.)
(2) Bob chooses a uniform n-bit string θ′n ∈ {0, 1}n and measures the j-th qubit in the computational (if θ′j = 0)
or Hadamard (if θ′j = 1) basis.
(3) Alice waits a fixed amount of time (to enforce the restriction on Bob’s quantum memory) and then sends θn to
Bob.
(4) Bob determines the index set as
I := {j ∈ [n] : θj = θ′j}
and obtains the corresponding substring xI .
Correctness of this protocol is easy to verify because the string xn is chosen uniformly at random by Alice and with high
probability Bob measures roughly half of the qubits in the correct basis. Security for honest Bob is a direct consequence
of the fact that the index set is determined by the positions at which θj ⊕ θ′j = 0. Since θ′n is chosen uniformly at random
by Bob, every index set is equally likely (and Alice is fully ignorant about it). Therefore, the only non-trivial scenario is
the case of honest Alice.
Let ρXnΘnB be the state of the protocol after step (1), where Xn and Θn are the classical random variables generated
by Alice and B is the quantum system received by Bob. The memory bound forces Bob to put the B subsystem through
a quantum channel which outputs a classical register K and a quantum register Q, which gives rise to ρXnΘnKQ. Since
Θn is eventually announced to Bob, our goal is to find a lower bound on Hmin(Xn|KQΘn). In the bounded-storage model
we can use the following chain rule
Hmin(X
n|KQΘn) ≥ Hmin(Xn|KΘn)− log dimQ. (4)
In case of noisy storage the argument is slightly more involved (see Section IIC 1 for details) but again the task reduces to
establishing uncertainty against a classical adversary. This is possible because generating random BB84 states is equivalent
to creating EPR pairs and measuring them in either computational or Hadamard basis and we know that outcomes of
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incompatible measurements cannot be predicted (perfectly) by a classical adversary. Indeed, it has been shown (Eq. (18)
in Ref. [KWW12]) that the resulting conditional min-entropy satisfies Hmin(Xn|KΘn) ≥ αn for
α = − log
(1
2
+
1
2
√
2
)
≈ 0.22.
Note that this bound is tight and is achieved if Bob measures every received qubit in the intermediate basis {|α0〉, |α1〉},
where
|α0〉 = cos(pi/8)|0〉+ sin(pi/8)|1〉,
|α1〉 = sin(pi/8)|0〉 − cos(pi/8)|1〉.
In case of trusted devices placing a lower bound on Hmin(Xn|KΘn) is possible because we know exactly the measurement
operators on Alice’s side. The main challenge in the DI scenario is to prove a lower bound which relies solely on properties
that can be certified device-independently. Our approach follows the intuition that observing a Bell violation implies
incompatibility of local observables which is sufficient to guarantee uncertainty. Previously, this approach has been used
successfully in proving security of DI QKD [TH13, LPT+13].
B. Preliminaries
For an integer n ∈ N let [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}. Throughout this paper we assume that all random variables are discrete
(they take a finite number of values) and that all quantum systems are finite-dimensional. Let H be a (finite-dimensional)
Hilbert space and let L(H)/H(H) be the set of linear/Hermitian operators acting on H. The Schatten ∞-norm of an
operator X is denoted by ||X||. The square root of a positive semidefinite operator X, denoted by √X, is defined as the
unique positive semidefinite operator Y satisfying Y 2 = X. The modulus of an operator X, denoted by |X|, is defined as
Y =
√
X†X. It is easy to verify that for arbitrary operators X and Y we have
|X + Y |2 + |X − Y |2 = 2(X†X + Y †Y ). (5)
The commutator of X and Y is defined as [X,Y ] = XY −Y X, while the anticommutator is defined as {X,Y } = XY +Y X.
A quantum state ρ is a Hermitian operator ρ ∈ H(H) which is positive semidefinite (ρ ≥ 0) and of unit trace (tr ρ = 1).
An observable is a Hermitian operator A ∈ H(H) which satisfies −1 ≤ A ≤ 1 (or equivalently ||A|| ≤ 1). Plugging X = AB
and Y = BA into Eq. (5) gives
|{A,B}|2 + |[A,B]|2 = 2(AB2A+BA2B) ≤ 4 · 1, (6)
where the upper bound follows from the fact that A2, B2 ≤ 1.
1. The CHSH inequality
In 1964 John Bell showed that measuring quantum systems leads to stronger-than-classical correlations [Bel64]. In 1969
Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt spelt out the simplest scenario in which this can be observed [CHSH69]. Let HA and
HB be Hilbert spaces and let A0, A1 ∈ H(HA) and B0, B1 ∈ H(HB) be binary observables. The CHSH operator is defined
as
W = A0 ⊗B0 +A0 ⊗B1 +A1 ⊗B0 −A1 ⊗B1
and the CHSH value equals β = tr(WρAB), where ρAB is a bipartite quantum state on HA ⊗HB . It is known that there
exist a state and observables that yield β = 2
√
2. On the other hand, if we restrict ourselves to classical systems (which
can be enforced by requiring the observables to commute, i.e. [A0, A1] = [B0, B1] = 0) we can only reach β = 2. This
scenario can be equivalently cast as a two-player game in which Alice receives x, Bob receives y (both chosen uniformly
at random) and are required to output a and b, respectively. The game is won if a⊕ b = x · y and it is straightforward to
show that the winning probability of this game pwin and the CHSH value β are related by
pwin =
1
2
+
β
8
.
Therefore, the optimal classical winning probability equals 34 , while the optimal quantum winning probability equals
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
≈ 0.85.
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2. Guessing with postmeasurement information
We start by defining the guessing probability and min-entropy for a classical-quantum (cq) state (we denote the quantum
register by B to be consistent with the protocol in which it is the dishonest Bob who faces the task of guessing).
Definition 1. Let ρXB be a cq-state
ρXB =
∑
x
px|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρBx ,
where ρBx are (normalised) quantum states and
∑
x px = 1. The optimal guessing probability of X given access to B is
defined as
pguess(X|B) := max{Mx}x
∑
x
px · tr(MxρBx ),
where the maximisation is taken over all POVMs. The conditional min-entropy of X given B is defined as
Hmin(X|B) := − log pguess(X|B).
Note that computing the guessing probability can be written as a semidefinite program, i.e. it can be computed efficiently
(in the input dimension). For a classical probability distribution PXY the expression simplifies to
pguess(X|Y ) =
∑
y
PY (y) ·max
x
PX|Y (x|y).
Alternatively, this maximisation can be written more compactly as
pguess(X|Y ) = max
f
Pr[X = f(Y )],
where the maximisation is taken over deterministic functions f : Y → X . It can be shown [Weh08] that the min-entropy
is additive on tensor products, i.e. given two uncorrelated cq-states ρX1B1 ⊗ ρX2B2 we have
Hmin(X1X2|B1B2) = Hmin(X1|B1) + Hmin(X2|B2).
We also need the notion of smooth min-entropy.
Definition 2. For ε ≥ 0 let Bε(ρXB) be the ball of cq-states of radius ε around ρXB, i.e. σXB ∈ Bε(ρXB) iff σXB is a
cq-state and
1
2
||σXB − ρXB ||1 ≤ ε,
where || · ||1 denotes the trace norm (Schatten 1-norm). Then, the smooth min-entropy of a cq-state ρXB is defined as
Hεmin(X|B)ρ := sup
σXB∈Bε(ρXB)
Hmin(X|B)σ.
Security analysis of two-party cryptography in the bounded or noisy storage model leads to the task of guessing with
postmeasurement information originally considered by Ballester, Wehner and Winter [BWW08]. Let ρXYB be a tripartite
ccq-state, where X is a classical register taking values in X , Y is a classical register taking values in Y and B is the
quantum system of Bob. In the postmeasurement information scenario Bob is forced to measure his subsystem B to
obtain some classical information F before learning Y . Later he learns the postmeasurement information Y and must
produce a guess for X. We will later show that without loss of generality we can assume that the outcomes of Bob’s
measurement (i.e. the possible values of F ) are labelled by functions f : Y → X such that Bob’s optimal guess upon
receiving y is f(y). Equivalently we can think of the outcome of the measurement as a sequence of guesses: one for every
possible value of the postmeasurement information.
Definition 3. Let ρXYB be a ccq-state
ρXYB =
∑
xy
pxy|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y | ⊗ ρBxy.
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The optimal guessing probability of X given access to B with Y as postmeasurement information is defined as
pguess(X|BY ∗) := max{Mf}f
∑
x,y,f
x=f(y)
pxy · tr(MfρBxy),
where the maximisation is taken over all POVMs with |X ||Y| outcomes labelled by functions f : Y → X and the star
( ∗) indicates that Y is only available after the measurement. The conditional min-entropy of X given B with Y as
postmeasurement information is defined as
Hmin(X|BY ∗) := − log pguess(X|BY ∗).
This is a useful formulation because defining
σBf =
∑
x,y
x=f(y)
pxyρ
B
xy
allows us to rewrite the objective function as∑
x,y,f
x=f(y)
pxy · tr(MfρBxy) =
∑
f
tr(Mfσ
B
f ),
which is equivalent to the standard guessing probability pguess(F |B) for the (unnormalised) state
ρFB =
∑
f
|f〉〈f | ⊗ σBf .
Therefore, this problem can also be solved efficiently using semidefinite programming techniques [BWW08]. Moreover,
just like in the standard guessing scenario, the min-entropy is additive over tensor products, i.e. given two uncorrelated
ccq-states ρX1Y1B1 ⊗ ρX2Y2B2 we have
Hmin(X1X2|B1B2Y ∗1 Y ∗2 ) = Hmin(X1|B1Y ∗1 ) + Hmin(X2|B2Y ∗2 ). (7)
The following proposition gives an alternative (but equivalent) formulation of the min-entropy with postmeasurement
information.
Proposition 1. Let ρXYB be a ccq-state and let P be the set of tripartite probability distributions over X,Y and K which
can be obtained by measuring subsystem B, i.e. PXYK ∈ P iff there exists a measurement {Nk}k such that
Pr[X = x, Y = y,K = k] = pxy · tr(NkρBxy).
Then, the following relation holds
pguess(X|BY ∗) = sup
PXYK∈P
pguess(X|KY ). (8)
Proof. Let us first show that the left-hand side is never larger than the right-hand side. Let {Mf}f be the POVM which
saturates the left-hand side and let PXYF be the resulting probability distribution. Then
pguess(X|BY ∗) =
∑
x,y,f
x=f(y)
pxy · tr(MfρBxy) =
∑
x,y,f
x=f(y)
PXYF (xyf) =
∑
y,f
PYF (yf) · PX|YF (f(y)|yf)
≤
∑
y,f
PYF (yf) ·max
x
PX|YF (x|yf) = pguess(X|FY ) ≤ sup
PXYK∈P
pguess(X|KY ).
To prove the other direction consider an arbitrary measurement {Nk}k (with a finite number of outcomes) which leads to
the probability distribution PXYK . For every value of k we define a function gk : Y → X such that
gk(y) = arg max
x
PX|YK(x|yk).
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This allows us construct a new measurement whose outcomes are labelled by functions f : Y → X
Mf =
∑
k:gk=f
Nk.
Using this measurement gives
pguess(X|BY ∗) ≥
∑
x,y,f
x=f(y)
pxy · tr(Mfρxy) =
∑
x,y,f
x=f(y)
∑
k:gk=f
pxy · tr(Nkρxy) =
∑
x,y,k
x=gk(y)
PXYK(xyk)
=
∑
y,k
PYK(yk) · PX|YK(gk(y)|ky) =
∑
y,k
PYK(yk) ·max
x
PX|YK(x|yk) = pguess(X|KY ).
By considering measurements that approach the optimal guessing probability we conclude that Eq. (8) holds. In particular,
this implies that the supremum can be replaced by a maximum.
The final security statement in the scenario of devices with memory is phrased in terms of sequential guessing probability.
Intuitively, this corresponds to the situation in which Bob is required to guess a sequence of random variables but before
each guess he gains access to an extra “advice variable”.
Definition 4. Let PX1X2...XnY1Y2...Yn be a probability distribution of 2n variables, where Xj and Yj take values in some
arbitrary finite sets X and Y, respectively. The sequential guessing probability of Xn = X1X2 . . . Xn given Y n = Y1Y2 . . . Yn
is defined as
pseqguess(X
n|Y n) = max
{fj}j
Pr[
n∧
j=1
Xj = fj(Y1Y2 . . . Yj)],
where the maximisation is taken over deterministic functions {fj}j such that fj : Y×j → X .
The sequential character of this quantity makes it meaningful to talk about a subset of rounds, e.g. the probability
of successfully guessing the first j variables pseqguess(Xj |Y j) is a well-defined quantity that depends only on PXjY j . This
stands in contrast to the usual guessing probability in which evaluating the probability of successfully guessing the first
bit requires the knowledge of the complete set of “advice variables”. Thanks to this property the sequential guessing
probability behaves well under conditioning
pseqguess(X
n|Y n) = pseqguess(Xn−1|Y n−1) · pguess(Xn|Y n,S),
where the second term is just the standard guessing probability of the last bit conditional on event S, which corresponds
to (sequentially) guessing the first n− 1 bits correctly.
3. Relation between transmitting classical information and uncertainty against noisy storage
Let F : L(HQin)→ L(HQout) be a quantum channel (a completely positive, trace preserving map) and suppose we want
to use it to transmit k bits of information. The following definition captures how well this can be achieved.
Definition 5. The optimal probability of successfully transmitting k bits of information through the channel F is defined
as
PFsucc(k) = max{ρx}x,{Mx}x
1
2k
∑
x∈{0,1}k
tr[MxF(ρx)],
where {ρx}x represents the encoding procedure (a set of 2k normalised states on Qin) while {Mx}x is the decoding mea-
surement (a measurement on Qout with 2k outcomes).
The following lemma by König, Wehner and Wullschleger relates the success probability to the maximal decrease in entropy
in the noisy storage setting [KWW12].
Lemma 1 (Lemma II.2, [KWW12]). Let F : L(HQin) → L(HQout) be a CPTP map. Consider an arbitrary ccq-state
ρXTQ and define
σXTQout := (idXT ⊗FQin→Qout)(ρXTQin),
where id stands for the identity channel. For any ε > 0 we have
Hεmin(X|TQout)σ ≥ − log PFsucc
(bHmin(X|T )− log(1/ε)c).
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4. Trade-off between non-locality and uncertainty against classical adversaries
As mentioned before a crucial component of our analysis is the trade-off between how well a pair of devices can perform
in the CHSH test and how unpredictable the output of a single device is against a classical adversary. It turns out that
such a (tight) trade-off can be established by finding the right measure of incompatibility of binary observables. In our
previous work we have used the effective anticommutator as a measure of incompatibility [KTW14]. Unfortunately, this
quantity does not allow us to bound uncertainty against classical side information (see Appendix A for a counterexample)
so here we consider a more refined quantity: the absolute effective anticommutator. Proposition 2 shows that observing a
CHSH violation places an upper bound on the absolute effective anticommutator.
Proposition 2. Let ρAB ∈ H(HA ⊗HB) be a bipartite quantum state and let A0, A1 ∈ H(HA) and B0, B1 ∈ H(HB) be
observables. The absolute effective anticommutator on Alice’s side is defined as
ε+ :=
1
2
tr
(|{A0, A1}|ρA).
The CHSH value of the setup is defined as β := tr(WρAB) for
W = A0 ⊗B0 +A0 ⊗B1 +A1 ⊗B0 −A1 ⊗B1.
The following relation holds
|β| ≤ 2
√
1 +
√
1− ε2+. (9)
Proof. The proof is a sequence of elementary inequalities (either at the level of numbers or operators). We will repeatedly
use the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, which says that for arbitrary operators X and Y we have
| tr(X†Y )|2 ≤ tr(X†X) · tr(Y †Y ).
We start by setting X† = W√ρAB and Y = √ρAB which gives
β2 =
[
tr(WρAB)
]2 ≤ tr(W 2ρAB). (10)
Writing out W 2 explicitly gives
W 2 = A20 ⊗ (B0 +B1)2 +A21 ⊗ (B0 −B1)2 + {A0, A1} ⊗ (B20 −B21)− [A0, A1]⊗ [B0, B1].
Let us first focus on the first three terms. Upperbounding A20 and A21 by 1 gives
A20 ⊗ (B0 +B1)2 +A21 ⊗ (B0 −B1)2 + {A0, A1} ⊗ (B20 −B21) ≤ 1⊗ 2(B20 +B21) + {A0, A1} ⊗ (B20 −B21).
Writing the identity in the eigenbasis of the anticommutator {A0, A1} =
∑
k λk|ek〉〈ek | gives
1⊗ 2(B20 +B21) + {A0, A1} ⊗ (B20 −B21) =
∑
k
|ek〉〈ek | ⊗
[
(2 + λk)B
2
0 + (2− λk)B21
] ≤ 4 · 1⊗ 1,
where the last inequality comes from upperbounding B20 and B21 by 1 (note that |λk| ≤ 2). We have therefore established
that
W 2 ≤ 4 · 1⊗ 1 + (− [A0, A1]⊗ [B0, B1]).
We bound the second term by its (operator) modulus
−[A0, A1]⊗ [B0, B1] ≤
∣∣[A0, A1]⊗ [B0, B1]∣∣ = |[A0, A1]| ⊗ |[B0, B1]|.
Neglecting the anticommutator term in inequality (6) leads to
|[B0, B1]|2 ≤ 4 · 1,
which implies that |[B0, B1]| ≤ 2 · 1. Therefore,
W 2 ≤ 4 · 1⊗ 1 + 2 |[A0, A1]| ⊗ 1
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and
tr(W 2ρAB) ≤ 4 + 2 tr
(|[A0, A1]|ρA). (11)
To upperbound tr
(|[A0, A1]|ρA) we again use the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality with X† = |[A0, A1]|√ρA and Y = √ρA
which gives [
tr
(|[A0, A1]|ρA)]2 ≤ tr (|[A0, A1]|2ρA). (12)
Inequality (6) implies that
tr
(|[A0, A1]|2ρA) ≤ 4− tr (|{A0, A1}|2ρA). (13)
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality one last time with X† = |{A0, A1}|√ρA and Y = √ρA gives[
tr
(|{A0, A1}|ρA)]2 ≤ tr (|{A0, A1}|2ρA). (14)
Since the left-hand side of Eq. (14) equals 4ε2+ combining it with inequalities (10), (11), (12) and (13) gives
β2 ≤ 4
(
1 +
√
1− ε2+
)
.
Taking a square root leads to the desired result.
It is easy to verify that this relation is in fact tight (it suffices to consider projective rank-1 measurements on the maximally
entangled state of two qubits). In Proposition 3 we show that the absolute effective anticommutator being small implies
uncertainty against classical adversaries.
Proposition 3. Let ρAK be a quantum-classical state
ρAK =
∑
k
pkρ
A
k ⊗ |k〉〈k |
and let A0 and A1 be two observables acting on the register A. Let ε+ = 12 tr
(|{A0, A1}|ρA) for ρA = ∑k pkρAk . Measuring
the observable chosen by a uniformly random register Θ and storing the outcome in the register X leads to the following
probability distribution.
Pr[X = x,Θ = θ,K = k] =
1
2
· pk · 1 + tr(Aθρ
A
k )
2
.
Then, the guessing probability satisfies
pguess(X|KΘ) ≤ 1
2
+
1
2
√
1 + ε+
2
. (15)
Proof. Let the effective anticommutator conditional on K = k be εk = 12 tr
({A0, A1}ρAk ). As shown in Ref. [KTW14] the
guessing probability averaged over the two bases satisfies
pguess(X|K = k,Θ) ≤ 1
2
+
1
2
√
1 + |εk|
2
.
Averaging over different values of K
pguess(X|KΘ) =
∑
k
pk pguess(X|K = k,Θ) ≤ 1
2
+
∑
k
pk
2
√
1 + |εk|
2
≤ 1
2
+
1
2
√
1 +
∑
k pk|εk|
2
,
where we have used the concavity of the square root. For any Hermitian operator A we have | tr(Aρ)| ≤ tr(|A|ρ) which
implies ∑
k
pk|εk| = 1
2
∑
k
pk
∣∣ tr({A0, A1}ρAk )∣∣ ≤ 12 ∑
k
pk tr
(|{A0, A1}|ρAk ) = 12 tr (|{A0, A1}|ρA) = ε+.
Therefore, the final bound is
pguess(X|KΘ) ≤ 1
2
+
1
2
√
1 + ε+
2
.
It turns out that this relation is tight and can be saturated by the same setup as before, which implies that the resulting
trade-off between the CHSH violation and uncertainty against classical adversaries is tight.
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5. Security definitions for WSE
Let Xn be the classical register representing the n-bit string given to Alice and let I be the classical register representing
the subset of indices given to Bob. Using the notation introduced in Section I security for honest Alice means that Bob
should find it difficult to guess the entire string Xn.
Definition 6. Let B be the register containing all the information that Bob might acquire during the protocol. Let SA
be the set of states on registers Xn, B that (dishonest) Bob may enforce at the end of the protocol. A WSE protocol is
(λ, ε)-secure for honest Alice if the smooth min-entropy satisfies
Hεmin(X
n|B) ≥ λn
for all σXnB ∈ SA.
Security for honest Bob, on the other hand, requires that the string Xn takes a particular value (which Alice cannot
influence anymore) and that Alice remains ignorant about the index set I that Bob received.
Definition 7. Let SB be the set of states on registers Xn, I, A that (dishonest) Alice may enforce at the end of the protocol.
A WSE protocol is (perfectly) secure for honest Bob if every state σXnIA ∈ SB can be written as
σXnIA = σXnA ⊗ 1I
2n
for some cq-state σXnA.
C. Protocol for DI WSE and security analysis
Since DI security can only be certified by observing some Bell violation we must make two modifications to Protocol 1:
(i) we have to turn it into an entanglement-based scheme and (ii) we must introduce some way of testing the devices.
The protocol we propose requires four devices in total: three for Alice and one for Bob. Below we describe the devices
available to Alice.
1. The source emits bipartite quantum states ρAB . According to the ideal specification, it should emit the maximally
entangled state of two qubits, i.e. ρAB = |Φ+〉〈Φ+ |AB for |Φ+〉AB = 1√2
(|0〉A|0〉B + |1〉A|1〉B).
2. The main device performs one out of two binary measurements represented by observables A0, A1. According to
the ideal specification, these should correspond to the computational and Hadamard basis measurements, A0 = σz,
A1 = σx.
3. The test device performs one out of two binary measurements represented by observables B0, B1. According to the
ideal specification, these should correspond to B0 = 1√2 (σz + σx), B1 =
1√
2
(σz − σx).
The only device available to Bob is a measurement device with two settings whose ideal specification coincides precisely
with that of the main device of Alice (so that the outcome are identical if the measurement settings coincide).
1. Security analysis for memoryless devices
We call a device memoryless if it acts in the same manner every time we use it: the source always emits the same state
and the measurement devices always perform the same measurements (and there are no correlations between different uses).
This greatly simplifies the security analysis for several reasons: (i) we may assume that the state, measurement operators
(and all quantities derived from them) are well-defined objects, (ii) probabilities can be estimated (to arbitrary precision)
by repeating the experiment multiple times and (iii) testing can be completely separated from the actual protocol. In
particular, the last point means that testing can be done beforehand and does need to be explicitly included in the
protocol. In our protocol Alice tests her three devices by using them to violate the CHSH inequality. More specifically,
she estimates the CHSH value
β = tr
[
(A0 ⊗B0 +A0 ⊗B1 +A1 ⊗B0 −A1 ⊗B1)ρAB
]
.
We know that if β ≤ 2 (no violation is observed), no security can be guaranteed and the devices cannot be used for
device-independent cryptography. Therefore, from now on we assume that β > 2. While no finite set of statistical data
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allows Alice to determine the exact value of β, she can estimate it to arbitrary precision which is sufficient for our analysis.
Since dealing with finite statistics is not the main focus of this paper, we assume that she can actually determine β exactly.
Recall that Proposition 2 establishes a connection between the observed CHSH violation and the local incompatibility
of observables (on either side). Since the test device will not take part in the actual protocol, we want to estimate the
incompatibility of the main device. If ε+ is the absolute effective anticommutator of the main device
ε+ :=
1
2
tr
(|{A0, A1}|ρA),
then from Proposition 2 we know that
ε+ ≤ β
4
√
8− β2. (16)
Our goal is to show that having an upper bound on ε+ suffices to prove security (for honest Alice) of the following DI
WSE protocol.
Protocol 2: DI WSE in the bounded/noisy storage model
(1) Alice uses the source to generate n bipartite states. She chooses a uniform n-bit string θn ∈ {0, 1}n and uses
the main device to measure the A register generated in the j-th run with θj as the input. All the B registers
are passed to Bob.
(2) Bob chooses a uniform n-bit string θ′n ∈ {0, 1}n and measures the j-th subsystem using θ′j as the input to his
measurement device.
(3) Alice waits a fixed amount of time (this waiting time motivates the restriction on Bob’s quantum memory) and
then sends θn to Bob.
(4) Bob determines the index set as
I := {j ∈ [n] : θj = θ′j} (17)
and obtains the corresponding substring xI .
It is easy to see that if the devices comply with the ideal specification, this is exactly the entanglement-based variant
of Protocol 1, hence, correctness follows straightforwardly. Security argument for honest Bob is closely related to the
simulation argument given in the original paper [KWW12] so we just describe it informally. The correct way of defining
the string Xn is by lifting the noisy memory restriction, i.e. we allow Bob to store all the states, wait until the receipt of
the basis information and only then perform all the measurements in the correct bases. This uniquely specifies the state
σXnA needed for Definition 7. At the same time Bob generates a random n-bit string θ′n and determines the index set I
through relation (17). It is easy to check that this results in a uniform distribution over all possible subsets uncorrelated
from the outside world (because θ′n was chosen uniformly at random).
Security analysis for honest Alice turns out to be more challenging.
Proposition 4. Protocol 2 executed against Bob whose quantum storage is bounded to be of dimension at most d imple-
ments WSE which is (λ, ε)-secure for honest Alice for ε = 0 and
λ ≥ h(ε+)− log d
n
,
where
h(x) := 1− log
(
1 +
√
1 + x
2
)
.
Proof. Using the source n times produces ρAnBn =
⊗n
j=1 ρAjBj . Alice measures all her subsystems using the main device
(which produces ρXnΘnBn =
⊗n
j=1 ρXjΘjBj ) and then Bob measures his subsystems to obtainK (which gives PXnΘnK). It
is important to emphasise that this final probability distribution is no longer of product form because Bob’s measurement
can introduce correlations between different rounds. First note that from Proposition 1 we have
Hmin(X
n|KΘn) ≥ Hmin(Xn|BnΘn∗), (18)
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where the left-hand side is evaluated on the probability distribution PXnΘnK , while the right-hand side is evaluated on
the quantum state ρXnΘnBn . Because this quantum state is of tensor product form we have
Hmin(X
n|BnΘn∗) =
n∑
j=1
Hmin(Xj |BjΘ∗j ) = n ·Hmin(X1|B1Θ∗1). (19)
where the first equality comes from the fact that the min-entropy is additive over tensor products (see Eq. (7)) and the
second simply expresses the fact that all the rounds are identical. Now we need the bound the entropy produced while
measuring a single copy of ρAB . Suppose that Bob measures the subsystem B to produce a classical random variable K.
From Proposition 3 we know that the min-entropy of the probability distribution PXKΘ satisfies
Hmin(X|KΘ) ≥ h(ε+).
Since this bound is valid for all measurements that Bob might perform, it also holds for the optimal measurement which
achieves Hmin(X|BΘ∗) = Hmin(X|KΘ) (see Proposition 1). Therefore, we also have
Hmin(X|BΘ∗) ≥ h(ε+). (20)
Combining expressions (18), (19) and (20) gives
Hmin(X
n|KΘn) ≥ nh(ε+). (21)
Finally, including the quantum memory of Bob (of dimension d) leads to
Hmin(X
n|KQΘn) ≥ nh(ε+)− log d.
Clearly, if the dimension of Bob’s memory is fixed, choosing large enough n brings the min-entropy rate arbitrarily close
to h(ε+).
Proposition 5. Protocol 2 executed against Bob whose quantum storage is represented by a quantum channel F implements
WSE which is (λ, ε)-secure for honest Alice, where ε > 0 is an arbitrary positive constant and
λ ≥ − 1
n
log PFsucc
(bnh(ε+)− log(1/ε)c).
Proof. Applying Lemma 1 to Eq. (21) (identify Xn ↔ X and KΘn ↔ T ) gives
Hεmin(X
n|KQoutΘn) ≥ − log PFsucc
(bnh(ε+)− log(1/ε)c).
Since in the noisy storage scenario K,Qout and Θn are the only registers available to Bob this coincides precisely with
Definition 6.
2. Security analysis for general devices against sequential attacks
As mentioned before in order to test devices that might behave differently in different rounds one must intersperse
the test rounds with the live rounds. The natural solution is to introduce a biased coin-flip at the beginning of every
round whose outcome determines whether the following round will be a test round (with probability q) or a live round
(with probability 1− q). In the previous scenario test rounds happened entirely within Alice’s laboratory (using the three
devices provided by Bob) and only live rounds required Alice and Bob to interaction. To make the sequential analysis
conceptually simpler we give Bob even more power and allow him to operate the test box (the device used for the CHSH
test), i.e. if Alice wants to play a test round she simply sends the second input (the one she would previously use for the
test device) to Bob who comes back with the outcome. Note that in this model the second part of the quantum state
generated by the source always ends up with Bob (regardless of whether it is a test round or a live round), which brings
us closer to the familiar scenario of two-player nonlocal games as shown in Fig. 6.
Let us stress that the interaction with the main device is always the same: regardless of whether the j-th round is a test
round or a live round Alice always inputs a uniformly random bit θj . This guarantees that the device remains ignorant
whether it is currently being tested or used for a live round. On the other hand, Bob’s interaction does depend on the
type of round performed. Let qj be the bit which specifies whether the j-th round is a live round (qj = 0) or a test round
(qj = 1). If Alice decides to test the devices, she will choose a random bit tj and request Bob to use it as an input in the
CHSH game and return the outcome yj . On the other hand, if Alice decides to play a live round, she will simply announce
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Fig. 6. The key to the security proof against sequential attacks is to combine the CHSH game between the main device and
the test device with the postmeasurement game between the main device and Bob’s device. As already noted in [Weh08], if the
postmeasurement game can be won perfectly, then the CHSH inequality cannot be violated. Here, we establish a complete trade-off
between winning the CHSH game and the postmeasurement game. If the CHSH game can be won well, then the probability for Bob
to succeed in the postmeasurement guessing game is low and hence the min-entropy about Alice’s resulting string given classical
information is high.
every round live round (Qj = 0) test round (Qj = 1)
Qj ,Θj , Xj Kj Tj , Yj
Table 1. The random variables generated in the j-th round. In every round Alice chooses the round type Qj , generates a random
input Θj and obtains an outcome Xj . If Qj = 0 (live round) Bob generates some classical information Kj (taking values in K). On
the other hand, if Qj = 1 (test round) Alice generates another random input Tj and passes it to Bob who must produce an output
Yj .
it to Bob and (according to the original protocol) she will not expect a response. Indeed, in the most general adversarial
scenario Bob would leave his quantum system untouched and only at the end of the protocol (immediately before the
memory bound) would he measure his entire system to produce some classical information k. Once he has received the
basis information, he computes his guess as a deterministic function of k and θ1, θ2, . . . , θn. In the sequential model we
force Bob to produce some classical side information kj in every round and we require that his guess in the j-th round is
a deterministic function (chosen before the protocol begins) of kj , θj and any information from the previous rounds. In
other words, for the j-th round (which we assume to be a live round) the probability of winning equals
Pr[Xj = fj(K
j ,Θj)],
where fj : (K × {0, 1})×j → {0, 1} is an arbitrary function chosen by Bob before the protocol begins. The summary of
random variables generated in each round is presented in Table 1. Note that in this model the requirement of immediately
producing the relevant classical information essentially replaces the need to restrict Bob’s storage capabilities. The fact
that success (or failure) can be assessed immediately after every round makes such a model well-suited for a standard
martingale-style analysis. It turns out that the only quantum component of such an analysis is the trade-off between the
winning probabilities of the live round and the test round denoted by pL and pT , respectively. Conveniently, we have
already investigated this trade-off since both probabilities can be bounded through the absolute effective anticommutator
ε+. More specifically, since the probability of passing the test pT is related to the CHSH violation β inequality (9) implies
pT ≤ 1
2
+
1
4
√
1 +
√
1− ε2+. (22)
On the other hand, probability of winning the test round cannot exceed the optimal guessing probability of a classical
adversary. Therefore, inequality (15) implies
pL ≤ 1
2
+
1
2
√
1 + ε+
2
. (23)
Combining inequalities (22) and (23) and treating ε+ as a parameter taking values in [0, 1] we determine the admissible
pairs (pL, pT ). The optimal trade-off is plotted in Fig. 7.
The protocol takes three parameters: the probability of testing q ∈ [0, 1], the CHSH threshold γ ∈ [ 34 , 1] and the number
of rounds n ∈ N. At the end of the protocol Alice calculates the fraction of successful CHSH rounds denoted by fCHSH.
If fCHSH < γ she aborts the protocol, otherwise she declares the execution correct. The security statement in this model
is simply a bound on the probability that Alice believes the protocol has terminated correctly and all the guesses of Bob
16
0.75 0.77 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.85
pT
0.88
0.92
0.96
1.00
p
L
Fig. 7. The (tight) trade-off between the winning probabilities of live and test rounds.
are correct. We define the following random variables
Rl :=
l∑
j=1
Qj (number of test rounds within the first l rounds),
Sl :=
l∑
j=1
(Xj ⊕ Yj ⊕ΘjTj ⊕ 1)Qj (number of successful test rounds within the first l rounds).
Let L := {j ∈ [n] : Qj = 0} be the set of live rounds and for j ∈ L let Gj be the event corresponding to Bob guessing the
outcome correctly, i.e.
Gj ⇐⇒ Xj = fj(Kj ,Θj). (24)
Moreover, let Hl be the event of guessing all the live rounds within the first l rounds
Hl ⇐⇒
∧
j∈[l]∩L
Gj . (25)
The failure event is defined as a conjunction of exceeding the CHSH threshold and Bob guessing all the live bits correctly
F ⇐⇒ Sn ≥ γRn ∧Hn. (26)
Before we delve into the proof, let us show why finding an upper bound on Pr[F ] is equivalent to proving security claim (3).
Let P be the event of passing, i.e. P ⇐⇒ Sn ≥ γRn and let ppass := Pr[P ]. Writing
Pr[F ] = ppass · Pr[Hn|P ] (27)
allows us to identify the last term with the sequential guessing probability conditioned on passing the test. Indeed, since
Hn ⇐⇒
∧
j∈L
Xj = fj(K
j ,Θj) (28)
and assuming that Bob has chosen the optimal set of functions {fj}j , we see that
Pr[Hn] = p
seq
guess(X
L|Y L) (29)
with Yj = (Kj ,Θj) being the j-th advice variable.
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To improve clarity of the proof it is convenient to define a variable which evaluates the test threshold after l rounds
Xl = Sl − γRl. Note that the transition l→ (l + 1) is governed by the following equation
Pr[Xl+1 ≥ x ∧Hl+1] = Pr[Xl ≥ x ∧Hl] · (1− q)pL + Pr[Xl ≥ x− (1− γ) ∧Hl] · qpT
+ Pr[Xl ≥ x+ γ ∧Hl] · q(1− pT ), (30)
where the three terms correspond to a successful live round, a successful test round and an unsuccessful test round,
respectively. In the following proposition we establish a recursive upper bound on the probability of failure.
Proposition 6. Let k ≥ 0 be an arbitrary real constant. For all l ∈ N the following inequality holds
Pr[Xl ≥ x ∧Hl] ≤ [α(q, γ, k)]le−kx, (31)
where α(q, γ, k) is a real constant defined as
α(q, γ, k) := max
(pL,pT )
[
(1− q)pL + qek(1−γ)pT + qe−kγ(1− pT )
]
(32)
and the maximisation is taken over all admissible pairs (pL, pT ).
Proof. Proof by induction. The statement is trivial for l = 0 and the second induction step follows directly from applying
the ansatz (31) to Eq. (30) (and we directly obtain the form of α(q, γ, k) given in Eq. (32)).
As an immediate corollary (set x = 0) we get a bound on the desired probability
Pr[F ] = Pr[Sn ≥ γRn ∧Hn] = Pr[Xn ≥ 0 ∧Hn] ≤ [α(q, γ, k)]n. (33)
Since this holds for any k ≥ 0, we choose the tightest bound
αmin(q, γ) := min
k≥0
α(q, γ, k), (34)
which leads to the final bound
Pr[F ] ≤ [αmin(q, γ)]n. (35)
While we do not know how to find αmin(q, γ) analytically, numerical evaluation is straightforward as explained in Ap-
pendix B. Some numerical results are plotted in Fig. 5.
III. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a protocol implementing DI WSE and proved security in two scenarios. In the memoryless scenario
the device is first extensively tested which allows to estimate the incompatibility between the two measurements. This
turns out to be sufficient to show a lower bound on the min-entropy of the output (against a classical adversary), which
happens to be tight. Due to the SDP formulation of the min-entropy we can show that the lower bound is additive when
multiple rounds are played (which is not obvious since Bob’s attack could introduce correlations between different rounds).
Moreover, we have considered a model in which the devices used by Alice might have memory but Bob is restricted to
sequential attacks. In this case a martingale-style approach leads to an explicit security statement.
A secure implementation of WSE leads directly to bit commitment since the reduction involves classical post-processing
only (which is trusted even in the device-independent setting). To turn WSE into some arbitrary universal functionality
(e.g. oblivious transfer) one needs to add trusted quantum communication or a secure (quantum proof) implementation of
another cryptographic primitive called interactive hashing (for explicit security bounds for such constructions see Sections
IV and V of Ref. [KWW12]). Alternatively, one can use our techniques to directly prove security of an oblivious transfer
protocol (in the bounded storage model) proposed in Ref. [DFR+07].
While this work constitutes a significant progress in the field of DI two-party cryptography, many open questions remain.
In the memoryless case we only obtain bounds on the min-entropy, while it is often advantageous to derive bounds on
other Rényi entropies. The problematic step in this case is the additivity of lower bounds if multiple rounds are played.
In case of the min-entropy additivity is a direct consequence of the SDP formulation (the same observation holds for
the collision entropy corresponding to the pretty good measurement) but we do not know if additivity holds in general.
While this problem might seem purely technical, it is of practical relevance as it would lead to significantly better security
guarantees.
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Another important open question is the analysis of devices with memory. In our analysis we have assumed that Bob’s
attack is sequential. Unfortunately, we know that sequential attacks are not always optimal (even if Alice’s behaviour is
sequential, see Appendix C for a simple counterexample). A security proof for devices with memory in this scenario is
arguably the most important open question related to DI two-party cryptography.
Finally, we note that in the realm of the noisy-storage model there are much more sophisticated analyses [DFW15],
which do not rely on the fact that we will first bound the adversary’s information about the string Xn when he is holding
classical information, and subsequently relate this to his information about Xn including quantum information. Instead,
one establishes a direct link between the adversary’s quantum information and his uncertainty about Xn [DFW15]. It
remains an interesting open question whether these techniques can be applied in the DI setting.
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Appendix A: Effective anticommutation is not sufficient against classical side information
Let {|j〉}3j=0} be a basis for a 4-dimensional Hilbert space. Consider the state
ρA =
1
2
(|0〉〈0|+ |2〉〈2|)
and binary observables
A0 = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|+ |2〉〈2| − |3〉〈3|,
A1 = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1| − |2〉〈2|+ |3〉〈3|.
It is easy to check that the anticommutator equals
{A0, A1} = 2
(|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1| − |2〉〈2| − |3〉〈3|),
which implies that the effective anticommutator equals 12 tr({A0, A1}ρA) = 0. While observable A0 leads to no uncertainty,
it is easy to verify that if we measure observable A1 we obtain a uniform outcome. Indeed, it is possible to show non-trivial
lower bound on Hα(X|Θ).
Now, suppose that somebody holds an extra bit of classical information about the system. More specifically, we consider
ρAK =
1
2
(|0〉〈0|A ⊗ |0〉〈0|K + |2〉〈2|A ⊗ |1〉〈1|K).
Measuring observable A1 now leads to an outcome which is still uniform but it is perfectly correlated with the classical regis-
ter K. Therefore, Hα(X|KΘ) = 0, which demonstrates that effective anticommutation does not imply uncertainty against
classical side information. This is consistent with evaluating the absolute effective anticommutator 12 tr(|{A0, A1}|ρA) = 1,
which does not yield a non-trivial uncertainty bound.
Appendix B: Numerical evaluation of αmin(q, γ)
Recall that our goal is to evaluate
αmin(q, γ) := min
k≥0
max
(pL,pT )
[
(1− q)pL + qek(1−γ)pT + qe−kγ(1− pT )
]
.
We first show that the maximisation over the admissible pairs (pL, pT ) can be performed analytically. Since the expression
inside the square bracket is increasing in both pL and pT the optimal point lies at the boundary, which can be parametrised
by the effective absolute anticommutator t = 12 tr
(|{A0, A1}| ρA) ∈ [0, 1]. Let us restate Eqs. (23) and (22)
pL(t) =
1
2
+
1
2
√
2
√
1 + t,
pT (t) =
1
2
+
1
4
√
1 +
√
1− t2 = 1
2
+
1
4
√
2
(√
1 + t+
√
1− t).
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Solving the maximisation problem corresponds to calculating g(k) := maxt∈[0,1] fk(t) for
fk(t) := A
√
1 + t+B
√
1− t+ C
with
A =
1
4
√
2
[
2(1− q) + qe−kγ(ek − 1)],
B =
qe−kγ(ek − 1)
4
√
2
,
C =
1− q
2
+
qe−kγ(ek + 1)
2
.
The first two terms can be written as an inner product 〈u, v〉 for u = (A,B) and v = (√1 + t,√1− t). Applying the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality leads to the following upper bound
g(k) ≤
√
2(A2 +B2) + C, (B1)
which can be achieved by choosing t = (A2 −B2)/(A2 +B2).
We do not know how to minimise g(k) over k ≥ 0 analytically but numerically it is an easy task because for all valid
(q, γ) we have g(0) = 1 and limk→∞ g(k) = ∞ and the function is convex. Therefore, there is a unique minimum which
corresponds precisely to αmin(q, γ).
There are three cases in which we should not be able to prove security:
• Alice never tests: q = 0.
• Alice always tests: q = 1.
• The threshold is classical: γ = 34 .
Here, we show that in all other cases we get αmin(q, γ) < 1. Assuming that q 6= 1 (if q = 1 there is no security possible
anyway) we find the Taylor expansion around k = 0√
2(A2 +B2) =
1− q
2
+
q
4
k +O(k2),
C =
1 + q
2
+
q(1− 2γ)
2
k +O(k2)
and therefore
g(k) = 1 +
(3
4
− γ
)
qk +O(k2).
This shows that whenever q > 0 and γ > 34 setting k small enough leads to g(k) < 1, which concludes the argument.
Appendix C: Sequential guessing is not necessarily optimal
Consider a device which can be used twice and recall that we use Θk and Xk to denote the input and output in the
k-th round, respectively. Alice’s subsystem consists of two qubits while Bob’s subsystem is a qudit. The initial state is
ρA1A2B =
1
2
(|0〉〈0|A1 ⊗ |0〉〈0|A2 + |1〉〈1|A1 ⊗ |1〉〈1|A2)⊗ ρB
for some fixed ρB . Since Bob’s state is uncorrelated, it carries no useful information so we can ignore it and assume that
Bob picks his “guessing functions” deterministically. In the first round the device of Alice performs the computational
basis measurement on the first qubit regardless of the value of Θ1. Therefore, the state after the first round is
ρX1A2 =
1
2
(|0〉〈0|X1 ⊗ |0〉〈0|A2 + |1〉〈1|X1 ⊗ |1〉〈1|A2).
In the second round the device performs a projective measurement on the second qubit but the basis depends on Θ2: if
Θ2 = X1 the qubit is measured in the computational basis (which ensures that X1 = X2, while if Θ2 6= X1 the qubit is
measured in the Hadamard basis (which leads toX1 and X2 being uncorrelated). It is easy to verify that the resulting
probability distribution PX1X2Θ2 (we have ignored Θ1 since it is uncorrelated from the other random variables) is
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Θ2 X1 X2 Pr
0 0 0 1/4
0 1 0 1/8
0 1 1 1/8
1 0 0 1/8
1 0 1 1/8
1 1 1 1/4
In the general scenario it is optimal for Bob to guess X1 = Θ2 and X2 = Θ2 which succeeds with probability 12 .
However, in the sequential scenario Bob must attempt to guess X1 before he learns Θ2. It is easy to verify that in this
case his guessing probability is at most 38 .
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